Before the

Federal Communications Commission

Washington, D.C. 20554

REPORT AND ORDER AND FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING

Adopted: March 16, 2023 Released: March 17, 2023

Comment Date (30 days after date of publication in the Federal Register)

Reply Comment Date (60 days after date of publication in the Federal Register)

By the Commission: Chairwoman Rosenworcel and Commissioner Starks issuing separate statements.

Heading Paragraph #

I. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................................1

II. BACKGROUND.....................................................................................................................................6

III. REPORT AND ORDER........................................................................................................................13

V. PROCEDURAL MATTERS.................................................................................................................66

VI. ORDERING CLAUSES........................................................................................................................76

APPENDIX A—FINAL RULES

APPENDIX B—LIST OF COMMENTERS

I. INTRODUCTION

people to friends and family, businesses to customers, and governments to constituents. However, with

that popularity comes unique risks. On many devices, consumers can immediately see some or all of

these messages, potentially piquing their interest and enticing them to open the message. Data shows

consumers read nearly all texts, and do so nearly immediately; whereas calls from unknown callers are

often ignored by consumers. While some text messages may present similar problems as unwanted

calls—they invade consumer privacy and are vehicles for consumer fraud and identity theft

protection.

2

This action will help to ensure that all wireless consumers receive the same protections,

regardless of which mobile wireless provider they use to receive SMS and MMS messages.

potentially harmful text messages; nevertheless, unlawful text messaging is trending in the wrong

direction. One source, for example, reports that consumer losses from scam texts were $231 million for

the first three quarters of 2022, up from $86 million for all of 2020. The time is therefore right for us to

take steps to protect consumers.

providers to block certain robotext messages

that are highly likely to be illegal.

Building on our call

e.g., Short Message Service (SMS) and Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS), not over-the-top (OTT) messaging,

such as iMessage and WhatsApp or Rich Communications Services (RCS). See 47 CFR § 64.1600(o) et seq.

2

3

of Wireless Messaging Service, WT Docket No. 08-7, Declaratory Ruling, 33 FCC Rcd 12075, 12082-12089, paras.

17-32 (2018) (Messaging Declaratory Ruling), recon. pending, Rept. No. 3011 (Feb. 5, 2019). SMS and MMS

wireless messaging services are not the functional equivalent of commercial mobile services (CMRS). Messaging

Declaratory Ruling, 33 FCC Rcd at 12093, para. 37.

consent, because the number displayed is illegally spoofed, which violates the Truth in Caller ID Act, or for other

reasons, particularly if they are fraudulent.

5

located in American Samoa, Anguilla, Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Canada,

Cayman Islands, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Maarten, St. Kitts & Nevis,

St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Turks & Caicos Islands, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States (including Puerto Rico,

the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands). 47 CFR § 52.5(d).

6

list, which include numbers that purport to be from invalid, unallocated, or unused numbers, and NANP

remedied by requiring providers and other entities to maintain a point of contact for texters to report

erroneously blocked texts.

text messages. We propose to require terminating providers to block texts from a sender after they are on

notice from the Commission that the sender is sending illegal texts, to extend the National Do-Not-Call

Registry’s protections to text messages, and to ban the practice of marketers purporting to have written

consent for numerous parties to contact a consumer, based on one consent.

consumers.

II. BACKGROUND

9

tactics to commit fraud using text messages.

10

According to CTIA, between 2015 and 2020, while the

total volume of text messages roughly doubled, the number of spam text messages that wireless providers

blocked grew ten times, from an estimated 1.4 billion in 2015 to 14 billion in 2020.

11

The App

Association observes that automated text messages have jumped nationally from 1 billion in July 2021 to

12 billion in June 2022.

12

This commenter also observes that illegal texts impose significant harm to

(Continued from previous page)

messaging only. However, a list so limited in scope that it leaves out obvious numbers that could be included with

little effort may be deemed unreasonable.

7

Unwanted Robocalls and Texts, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/stop-unwanted-robocalls-and-texts (last

visited Dec. 19, 2022); Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Advice, How to Recognize and Report Spam Text

Messages, https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-recognize-and-report-spam-text-messages (last visited Feb. 2,

2023).

8

consumers, particularly for aging Americans struggling with digital literacy.

according to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), consumers have reported greater losses, at $231

million, from text message scams in the first three quarters of 2022 than in all of 2020 and 2021

“Smishing” is a term that combines SMS and phishing. Scammers use smishing to target consumers with deceptive

text messages sent to their smart devices. FCC, Avoid the Temptation of Smishing Scams,

https://www.fcc.gov/avoid-temptation-smishing-scams (last visited Feb. 8, 2023).

from illegal texts is more than just economic in nature; fraudulent, misleading texts can also erode trust in

prevalent methods used to deliver phishing attacks to consumers.

scammer can use a stolen application programming interface (API) key assigned to a legitimate business

Campaign Verify Comments at 3.

23

Public Knowledge Reply at 2.

24

WMC Global Comments at 3.

25

Id. The API keys are typically stolen through data breaches, business email compromise, and insider threats. Id.

26

Call blocking is “stopping calls outright so that they do not ring a phone, routing the calls directly to voicemail

without ringing the phone, or some other treatment, such as interactive voice response session or voice call

28

2017 Call Blocking Report and Order, 32 FCC Rcd at 9710-21, paras. 10-40. Phone numbers that are only used

by their subscribers to receive inbound calls can be placed on a DNO list. Id. at 9710, para. 10.

29

2019 Call Blocking Declaratory Ruling, 34 FCC Rcd at 4886-88, paras. 33-34.

30

Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, CG Docket No. 17-59, Third Report and Order,

Order on Reconsideration, and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 FCC Rcd 7614, 7623-31, paras.

20-45 (2020) (Call Blocking Third Report and Order). The first of these safe harbors protects terminating voice

service providers that block calls based on reasonable analytics, including caller ID authentication information,

designed to identify unwanted calls so long as the consumer is given the opportunity to opt out. Id. at 7625-27,

paras. 25-34. The second safe harbor protects any voice service provider that blocks calls from a bad-actor upstream

voice service provider that fails to effectively mitigate illegal traffic when notified of such traffic by the

The Call Blocking Fourth Report and Order also required voice service providers to take steps to stop

making its previously permissive blocking policy mandatory in certain circumstances.

dialing system and calls made using a prerecorded or artificial voice to mobile telephone numbers require

consumer consent.

37

In 2015, the Commission also clarified that Internet-to-phone text messages, which

are sent via the Internet to a mobile wireless provider and then routed to a consumer’s phone over the

provider’s wireless network, are also covered by the TCPA’s protections.

38

solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless and wireline phones when the consumer has added their

(Continued from previous page)

31

32

The current industry traceback consortium is the Industry Traceback Group (ITG), which is a group of voice

service providers, wireline, wireless, and VoIP, that are tracing and identifying the source of illegal robocalls. See

ITG, https://tracebacks.org (last visited Dec. 21, 2022).

33

Call Blocking Fourth Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd at 15226-27, para 13. See 47 CFR § 64.1200(n)(2). In our

Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking we are seeking comment on extending to text messages the existing

requirement that voice service providers take steps to effectively mitigate illegal traffic when a voice service

provider receives actual written notice of such traffic from the Commission.

34

See 47 CFR §§ 64.1200 (k)(5), (k)(6), (n)(1), (f)(19), (n)(4), (n)(5), (n)(6), (o), (p).

36

Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278,

Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014, 14115, para. 165 (2003) (2003 TCPA Order). The DNC rules apply to calls

to wireline and wireless phones. Id. at 14115-16, paras. 165-66.

37

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). In the Facebook v. Duguid decision, the Supreme Court clarified that “a necessary

feature of an autodialer under § 227(a)(1)(A) is the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator to

either store or produce phone numbers to be called.” Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S.Ct. 1163, 1171 (2021)

(Facebook). The Commission made clear in 2003 that “calls” include text messages to wireless numbers including,

wireline or wireless number to the National DNC Registry.

of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations”;

this rule also applies to wireless

telephone numbers.

42

Yet, while the Commission included both wireless and wireline numbers in the

III. REPORT AND ORDER

to take

action to protect consumers from certain text messages that are highly likely to be illegal. We require

these mobile wireless providers to block texts that purport to be from NANP numbers on a reasonable

DNO list, which include numbers that purport to be from invalid, unallocated, or unused numbers, and

NANP numbers for which the subscriber to the number has requested that texts purporting to originate

from that number be blocked; these are texts that no reasonable consumer would wish to receive because

they are highly likely to be illegal. At the same time, and also consistent with our work on call blocking,

we take steps to mitigate the risk of erroneous blocking by requiring mobile wireless providers to ensure

was the result of an error. 2003 TCPA Order, 18 FCC Rcd at 14040, para. 38; 47 CFR § 64.1200(c)(2)(i)-(iii).

41

47 CFR § 64.1200(c)(2). See also 2003 TCPA Order, 18 FCC Rcd at 14034, para. 28.

42

47 CFR § 64.1200(e).

43

The Commission has previously concluded that SMS and MMS text messaging is an information service and not a

common-carrier service. See Messaging Declaratory Ruling, 33 FCC Rcd at 12082-12089, paras. 17-32, recon.

pending, Rept. No. 3011 (Feb. 5, 2019).

44

45

Spoofing is falsifying the caller ID information that appears on the called party’s phone with the intent to defraud,

cause harm, or wrongfully obtain something of value. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e).

3

Reply at 2-3; Sinch Comments at 6-7; Telesign Comments at 2-3; T-Mobile Comments at 9-10; Verizon Comments

at 7 & Reply at 4-5; WMC Global Comments at 2; AT&T Reply at 9-10; Cloud Communications Reply at 1-2;

RWA Reply at 3-5; Vibes Reply at 2-4.

47

The rules we adopt in this Order are limited to SMS and MMS text messaging; therefore, for purposes of this

Order, the service providers offering SMS and MMS text messaging are “mobile wireless providers.”

bulk message senders, the CTIA Messaging Principles and Best Practices, and providers’ own

requirements and guidance.

49

We believe that our actions and proposals today complement those efforts

from robotext messages convinces us to take additional measures to protect consumers. As some

commenters note, robotexts will likely increase as scammers migrate from calling to texting.

We agree

51

messages grows, so does the risk to consumers. Our action ensures protection for all wireless consumers,

regardless of which mobile wireless provider they use to receive messages. We therefore disagree with

CTIA, that we could undermine current efforts by mobile wireless providers to protect consumers from

scam texts because there is a risk that some providers will “divert resources away from innovative

52

of the rules we adopt and the unchallenged record data that consumers are increasingly harmed by text

scams, we are not persuaded that mobile wireless providers would divert significant resources from other

anti-spam initiatives and that they are not needed at this time. Nor does anything in the rules we adopt

here prevent mobile wireless providers from engaging in existing or future anti-spam efforts or require

them to block messages from short codes or OTT applications.

48

See, e.g. CTIA Comments at 8-9; INCOMPAS Comments at 6; T-Mobile Comments at 6; VON Comments at 3;

AT&T Reply at 5; NCLC/EPIC Joint Reply at 5.

49

See, e.g., CTIA Comments at 9; Sinch Comments at 3; T-Mobile Comments at 4-7; Verizon Comments at 2;

AT&T Reply at 3-6.

50

NORC Reply at 1.

51

Commenters share this goal of protecting consumers from illegal text messages. See, e.g., AB Handshake

Christopher L. Shipley, INCOMPAS; David Casem, Telnyx; Paula Boyd, Microsoft; Helen Marie Berg, Google,

Michael Pryor, Cloud Communications Alliance; Greg Rogers, Bandwidth to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal

with calls, we find that no reasonable consumer would wish to receive text messages that spoof a number

be from numbers on a reasonable DNO

from numbers on a reasonable DNO

voice calls; (iv) consumers expect to receive texts from unfamiliar numbers, e.g., as appointment

56

57

Id.

example, iconectiv observes that SMS fraudsters often use unallocated numbers from foreign jurisdictions.

iconectiv Comments at 1-2. For this reason, some mobile wireless providers already incorporate this DNO

information into their blocking algorithms. iconectiv Comments at 2.

227(e)).

explains that the architecture of wireless messaging platforms is such that wireless providers already

wireless providers use this information to deliver text messages typically only from authorized providers

and user identifiers using valid originating information through appropriate routing channels, and to more

ID information and a common carrier regulatory regime, which does not apply to text messages.

commenters explain that STIR/SHAKEN would not be a viable solution if spoofing were more prevalent,

autodialed and prerecorded or artificial voice calls to residential and wireless telephone numbers absent

block calls that unlawfully spoof numbers on reasonable DNO lists, and thus is authorized by the Truth in

As courts have recognized, Title III “endow[s] the Commission with ‘expansive powers’ and a

particular, section 303(b) authorizes the Commission to “[p]rescribe the nature of the service to be

rendered by each class of licensed stations and each station within each class,” and that is what our

enormous economic impact, and in view of the lack of clear statutory authority . . . the Commission

should await more direct authorization from Congress before proceeding to rules.”

First, AT&T’s

reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia v. EPA is inapt in this regulatory context,

where Congress has granted the Commission “expansive powers” and a “comprehensive mandate” to

longstanding and remains unaltered—recognizes that the field of radio communications is “dynamic” and

rapidly changing, and court decisions such as Cellco Partnership have recognized that the Commission

has broad authority under Title III to adopt rules addressing what services must be rendered by

licensees.

Second, the limited obligations on mobile wireless providers adopted here are far from the

defines the form mobile-internet service must take for those who seek a license to offer it.”). We find several other

provisions of Section 303 relevant here. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (requiring the Commission to “encourage the larger

and more effective use of radio in the public interest”); id. § 303(r) (authorizing the Commission to “[m]ake such

rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary

to carry out the provisions of this [Act]”).

121

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EPA,

range of issues on which we sought comment in the NPRM, including caller ID authentication for text

messages, as well as an unsupported assertion that the rules would have an “enormous economic

impact.”

However, we are adopting only two narrow rules in this Report and Order, and we find that

these rules will not have an enormous economic impact and will not be overly burdensome for mobile

wireless providers to implement (in part, because some providers, like AT&T, are already “broadly

block[ing] text messages sent from invalid, unallocated, unassigned, and spoofed numbers”).

Further,

basis for challenging the assumptions behind it.

128

In the analysis of the expected benefits, we estimated

that consumers incur a 5 cent nuisance harm for each spam text received.

consumers incur $2 billion in harm due to fraudulent spam texts annually.

130

Our estimates were based on

131

that they are less disruptive to consumers, e.g., because consumers can simply delete a text instead of

having to listen to a robocall first then delete it. Further, we assumed that harm from fraudulent spam

texts is about 20% of the harm caused by fraudulent robocalls fraud costs.

source puts financial losses due to spam texts at $28 billion in 2022.

blocking of illegal robotexts would achieve an annual benefit of at least $6.3 billion.

133

In the NPRM we

Reply at 3-7; EZ Texting Comments at 6; M

3

Pinger Comments at 2; Sinch Comments at 7-8; Somos Comments at 7-8; Telesign Comments at 3; T-Mobile

Comments at 3; Verizon Comments at 2; VON Comments at 3; AT&T Reply at 5 (AT&T employs a multi-layered

defense against illegal and unwanted text messages that incorporates technological innovation and proactive

collaboration).

126

127

Entities with Access to Numbering Resources, WC Docket Nos. 17-97, 20-67, Report and Order and Further Notice

of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 FCC Rcd 3241, 3263, paras. 47-48 (2020) (STIR/SHAKEN Order).

132

https://www.robokiller.com/the-robokiller-report (last visited Feb. 14, 2023).

adopt today will not block all spam texts, it will block some percentage of them. Even a small reduction

in spam texts would result in benefit to consumers of many millions of dollars annually. Because costs to

IV. FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING

terminating mobile wireless providers to block text messages when notified by the Commission that they

are likely scams. We also seek comment on text message authentication. Next, we propose to extend Do-

Not-Call protections to marketing text messages. We also seek to ban the practice of obtaining a single

consumer consent as justification for calls and texts from multiple, sometimes hundreds, of sellers and

potential fraudsters.

141

(Continued from previous page)

134

AT&T Reply at 13-14.

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136

137

potentially block texts from a sender after they are on notice from the Commission that the sender is

transmitting suspected illegal texts, similar to our requirement for gateway providers with respect to voice

calls. Where texts are clearly illegal, and where the Commission has put providers on notice of the illegal

texts, we believe mobile wireless providers have no legitimate reason to transmit the texts. We therefore

seek comment on extending this approach, which the Commission has in place for call blocking, to text

blocking.

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providers and texts, as we did there for gateway providers and voice calls.

a Notification of Suspected Illegal Traffic that: (1) identifies with as much particularity as possible the

suspected illegal traffic; (2) provides the basis for the Enforcement Bureau’s reasonable belief that the

identified traffic is unlawful; (3) cites the statutory or regulatory provisions the suspected illegal traffic

investigate the identified traffic and either block the identified traffic and substantially similar traffic on

an ongoing basis or respond to the Commission that the provider has a reasonable basis for concluding

that the identified calls are not illegal.

process through which the Enforcement Bureau can require all providers immediately downstream from

146

would suggest that this model would not work well for texting. What would be the cost to providers of

implementing such a requirement? Can providers and the Commission’s Enforcement Bureau properly

trace text messages to their originating provider to effectuate these rules? Are there additional

requirements the Commission should adopt to ease any traceback efforts for text messaging? Because

providers state that they already do a considerable amount of text blocking,

proposal to impose material additional costs. Is that correct? We seek comment on these questions

144

145

146

at paras. 84-86.

147

messages based on the current record.

some commenters say number spoofing is not a problem for text messages,

their phone numbers or identities.

In the robocalling context, the Commission has found that a subset

might the Commission encourage industry members to collaborate and finalize technical solutions for

authenticating text messages and mitigating illegal text messages? For example, should the Commission

protections apply to text messages as well as voice calls and to codify this clarification in our rules. The

National Do-Not-Call Registry has been operational for almost two decades and currently protects over

represents a critical component of our policy strategy against unwanted calls. Although the Commission

and a caller ID authentication solution, even if feasible, would be unlikely to reduce unwanted and illegal text

messages. See, e.g., CTIA Comments at 4-5, 11; EZ Texting Comments at 5-6; M

3

NetNumber Comments at 7 & Reply at 2-3; Sinch Comments at 6-7; Telesign Comments at 2-3; T-Mobile

Comments at 9-10; Verizon Comments at 7 & Reply at 4-5; WMC Global Comments at 2; Cloud Communications

Reply at 1-2; RWA Reply at 3-5; Vibes Reply at 2-4.

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illegal texting and solutions must not endorse or enable anti-competitive practices that providers have seen in the

industry); Cloud Communications Reply at 3 (noting concerns that the industry’s application of current principles

do-not-call-registry-data-book-fiscal-year-2022 (last visited Feb. 2, 2023). The TCPA defines a “telephone

solicitation” as “the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental

of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is transmitted to any person” but not including calls or

messages made with prior express invitation or permission, to any person with whom the caller has as established

business relationship, or by a tax exempt nonprofit organization. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3).

154

155

Commission has previously taken the position that the National DNC Registry protects consumers from unwanted

by requiring prior express invitation or permission in writing for calls to wireless numbers on the DNC

As these commenters note, the DNC rules would bring considerable protection for recipients of marketing

TCPA.

159

In this regard, would our proposal also represent an important codification of consumer

protections? Are there downsides to our proposal?

Assurance IQ Petition was submitted May 10, 2022. Letter from Paul C. Besozzi, counsel for Assurance IQ, LLC,

to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission (May 10, 2022), filed in CG Docket No. 02-

telemarketers and scam callers.

but, commenters argue, the consumer has not consented to the particular caller or callers, which may be

listed as “partner companies” in these arrangements.

consent be considered granted only to callers logically and topically associated with the website that

solicits consent and whose names are clearly disclosed on the same web page.

addressed this aspect of consent in the past. Would our proposal better protect consumers from receiving

large numbers of calls and texts they do not wish to receive when they visit websites such as comparison

from unrelated companies? Commenters should discuss whether our proposal would limit the value of

whether the proposed rule will clarify consent and help to eliminate illegal text messages and calls.

there different or additional limitations on multi-party consent we should consider?

included in a disclosure, clearly advise the consumer that telemarketing calls will result from an online submission,

including people of color and others who have been historically underserved, marginalized, and adversely

seek comment on how our proposals may promote or inhibit advances in diversity, equity, inclusion, and

accessibility.

Commission that they are likely scams; (ii) text message authentication; (iii) extending Do-Not-Call

protections to marketing text messages; and (iv) preventing marketers from using a single consumer

consent as justification for calls and texts from numerous parties.

to text messages. We seek comment on our authority under the Truth in Caller ID Act for these

and impartial treatment of all individuals, including individuals who belong to underserved communities that have

been denied such treatment, such as Black, Latino, and Indigenous and Native American persons, Asian Americans

and Pacific Islanders and other persons of color; members of religious minorities; lesbian, gay, bisexual,

transgender, and queer (LGBTQ+) persons; persons with disabilities; persons who live in rural areas; and persons

otherwise adversely affected by persistent poverty or inequality. See Exec. Order No. 13985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009,

Executive Order on Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal

Government (Jan. 20, 2021).

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numbers for which the subscriber to the number has requested that texts purporting to originate from that

employees and that any such burdens would be far outweighed by the benefits to consumers from

blocking text messages that are highly likely to be illegal.

information collection requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce

paperwork burdens, invites the general public and OMB to comment on any information collection

requirements contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public

Law 104-13. In addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-

economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.”

176

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) concerning the impact of the rule changes contained in the

Report and Order on small entities. The FRFA is set forth in Appendix D. We have also prepared an

the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget concurs, that this

rule is “non-major” under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 804(2). The Commission will send

a copy of this Report and Order to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to 5

U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).

accordance with the Commission’s ex parte rules.

177

Persons making ex parte presentations must file a

copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two

Angela Simpson, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Competitive Carriers Association to Marlene H.

Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission (Mar. 9, 2023) at 1 (CCA ex parte) (30 days is

insufficient).

175

Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 847 (1996). The SBREFA

was enacted as Title II of the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996 (CWAAA).

APPENDIX C

PART 64—MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS

Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.”

prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorizes such advertisements or

entity, or to multiple entities logically and topically associated. If the prior express written consent is to

multiple entities, the entire list of entities to which the consumer is giving consent must be clearly and

conspicuously displayed to the consumer at the time consent is requested. To be clearly and

conspicuously displayed, the list must, at a minimum, be displayed on the same web page where the

consumer gives consent.

APPENDIX D

1

as amended, an Initial

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

2

the proposals in the NPRM, including comment on the IRFA. The Commission received no comments in

response to the IRFA. This present Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the RFA.

purport to be from numbers on a reasonable Do-Not-Originate (DNO)

proposed rules as a result of those comments.

proceeding.

the number of small entities that may be affected by the proposed rules and policies, if adopted.

RFA generally defines the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as the terms “small business,”

“small organization,” and “small governmental jurisdiction.”

In addition, the term “small business” has

2

FCC 22-72, 2022 WL 4545905 (2022) (NPRM).

3

4

5

6

business concern” is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field

over time, may affect small entities that are not easily categorized at present. We therefore describe, at

businesses represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United States, which translates to 32.5 million

businesses.

for-profit enterprise which is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.”

11

generally as “governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special

districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.”

of Governments

indicate there were 90,075 local governmental jurisdictions consisting of general

10

Id.

11

See 5 U.S.C. § 601(4).

12

The IRS benchmark is similar to the population of less than 50,000 benchmark in 5 U.S.C § 601(5) that is used to

define a small governmental jurisdiction. Therefore, the IRS benchmark has been used to estimate the number small

organizations in this small entity description. See Annual Electronic Filing Requirement for Small Exempt

Organizations – Form 990-N (e-Postcard), “Who must file,” https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/annual-

exempt/non-profit organizations. The data utilized for purposes of this description was extracted from the IRS EO

BMF data for businesses for the tax year 2020 with revenue less than or equal to $50,000 for Region 1-Northeast

purpose governments and special purpose governments in the United States.

populations of less than 50,000.

estimate that at least 48,971 entities fall into the category of “small governmental jurisdictions.”

establishments engaged in operating and maintaining switching and transmission facilities to provide

communications via the airwaves.

Establishments in this industry have spectrum licenses and provide

services using that spectrum, such as cellular services, paging services, wireless internet access, and

wireless video services.

The SBA size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has

24

employees.

26

16

See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 Census of Governments – Organization Table 2. Local Governments by Type and

State: 2017 [CG1700ORG02], https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html. Local

governmental jurisdictions are made up of general purpose governments (county, municipal and town or township)

and special purpose governments (special districts and independent school districts). See also tbl.2. CG1700ORG02

18

See id. at tbl.6. Subcounty General-Purpose Governments by Population-Size Group and State: 2017

[CG1700ORG06], https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html. There were 18,729

municipal and 16,097 town and township governments with populations less than 50,000.

19

See id. at tbl.10. Elementary and Secondary School Systems by Enrollment-Size Group and State: 2017

[CG1700ORG10], https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html. There were 12,040

independent school districts with enrollment populations less than 50,000. See also tbl.4. Special-Purpose Local

Local Governments by State_Census Years 1942 to 2017.

20

of Governments data does not provide data aggregated based on population size for the special purpose governments

independent school districts with enrollment populations of less than 50,000 (12,040), from the 2017 Census of

Satellite),” https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=517312&year=2017&details=517312.

23

Id.

24

See 13 CFR § 121.201, NAICS Code 517312 (as of 10/1/22, NAICS Code 517112).

25

See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 Economic Census of the United States, Employment Size of Firms for the U.S.:

2017, Table ID: EC1700SIZEEMPFIRM, NAICS Code 517312,

26

Id. The available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a more precise estimate of the number of firms that

meet the SBA size standard.

as of December 31, 2020, there were 797 providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of

considered small entities.

engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking, communications

systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to, and receiving telecommunications from,

or less as small.

33

data, the Commission estimates that the majority of “All Other Telecommunications” firms can be

considered small.

Order adopts a requirement that mobile wireless providers block texts purporting to be from NANP

unused numbers, and NANP numbers for which the subscriber to the number has requested that texts

Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Universal Service Monitoring Report at 26, Table 1.12 (2021),

https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-379181A1.pdf.

28

Id.

29

See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 NAICS Definition, “517919 All Other Telecommunications,”

https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=517919&year=2017&details=517919.

30

Id.

31

32

See 13 CFR § 121.201, NAICS Code 517919 (as of 10/1/22, NAICS Code 517810).

meet the SBA size standard. We also note that according to the U.S. Census Bureau glossary, the terms receipts and

revenues are used interchangeably, see https://www.census.gov/glossary/#term_ReceiptsRevenueServices.

in reaching its approach, which may include the following four alternatives, among others: “(1) the

and reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the use of performance rather than

design standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small entities.”

35

purport to be from numbers on a reasonable Do-Not-Originate

illegal and for that reason the Commission is adopting a requirement to block at the network level. The

Commission recognizes that mobile wireless providers, including small entities, already take measures to

block illegal text messages from reaching their customers’ phones and this requirement should not be

of contact for call blocking purposes, and because the Order states that providers and entities may use the

report to be sent to Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act.

will send a copy of the Report and Order, including this FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the

SBA. The Order and FRFA (or summaries thereof) will also be published in the Federal Register.

35

5 U.S.C. § 603(c)(1)–(c)(4).

36

See 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).

37

See id. § 604(b).

APPENDIX E

the Commission

has prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small entities by the policies proposed

2

addition, the FNPRM and the IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register.

terminating mobile wireless providers to block text messages when notified by the Commission that they

are likely scams; (ii) text message authentication; (iii) extending Do-Not-Call protections to marketing

text messages; and (iv) banning the practice of obtaining a single consumer consent as justification for

calls and texts from multiple sellers and potential fraudsters.

6

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 632). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 601(3), the statutory definition of a small business applies “unless an

agency, after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and after opportunity

for public comment, establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of the

agency and publishes such definition(s) in the Federal Register.”

the outset, three broad groups of small entities that could be directly affected herein.

First, while there

small business is an independent business having fewer than 500 employees.

businesses represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United States, which translates to 32.5 million

14

Id.

16

See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 Census of Governments – Organization Table 2. Local Governments by Type and